Responing to David Hinds
By Randy Persaud PhD
Guyana Journal, May 2006
David Hinds, Social Scientist and WPA activist, states: “The African problem, while it shares some characteristics with those of the other races, has its own peculiarities which must be taken into account.” (Letter to the Editor in Stabroek News, May 5th 2006) Before responding to some of the specifics and astounding claims made by David Hinds, I should note that he is one of the organic intellectuals of African nationalism in Guyana. It is Hinds, for instance, who has over the years argued that a regular electoral mandate is not good for democracy in Guyana. He prefers something extra-electoral.
Hinds’ basic claim is that although Africans have suffered more, they have less. The logic is that because they have suffered more, they have an entitlement to make extraordinary claims.
The suffering part is absolutely correct. Africans were massively exploited for economic gain, not only in Guyana, but throughout the Western hemisphere. In many instances, there was state sponsored theft of the property of people of African descent. For instance, in 1705 the Commonwealth of Virginia declared that the private property of Africans shall become available to the “public”. The public in this instance was a code word for poor whites.
Indians who argue that indentureship was a form of slavery miss the point. Indians had a right to themselves and their belongings. By comparison the African slave was himself/herself the private property of someone else. I know many Guyanese Indian nationalists will kick and scream when another Indian accepts the argument that Africans did suffer more during colonial rule. But the history is irrefutable on this. The question though is this – does it matter who suffered more under colonial domination? The short answer for black nationalists is yes.
For nationalists like Hinds, African suffering set up structures of inequality that persist until today. Here is Hinds on that score –“...it must also be said that contemporary African economic stagnation happens in the context of a historical economic strangulation that has been deliberately designed to ensure that Africans remain at the bottom of the economic ladder.” This is a strong statement, but inflammatory as it sounds, it has a lot of truth to it.
The problem though is that Hinds pitches his generalization too far. The statement is correct in the case of apartheid South Africa and Zimbabwe, and in the United States. People of African descent were prohibited from access to the basic building blocks of economic success. They were not allowed in proper schools, were denied jobs due their race, were prevented from owning houses by neighborhood associations and other ingenious subterfuges, were discriminated against in the military, and the list can go on and on. In contemporary times, inner cities have been abandoned, while billions of dollars go to farmers, ranchers, and oil companies. This is the real reason why 40% of all African American children still live in poverty, and this, notwithstanding the affirmative action that Hinds praises.
But does this generalization apply to Guyana. The short answer is no. Here is why. In the United States and South Africa, the people who are at the top of the economic ladder are there in part because of their race. Whites in both societies are direct beneficiaries of a racialized socio-economic structure. More pointedly, economic inequality in the US and South Africa today can be explained in part by the way in which state power has been used to deny blacks normal economic opportunities. Guyana is different for three basic reasons.
Firstly, Indians were also at the receiving end of economic exploitation by the planters and the state machinery. At least half the population of Guyana might still remember the logies that Indians were living in as late as the 1970s. I was born in one of them myself. My grandfather who worked on a sugar plantations from 1912 through 1965 got a monthly pension barely enough for a return trip to “Big Hospital” located in Georgetown.
Secondly, Indians never enslaved Africans in Guyana. This is so basic but it needs to be stated because the African nationalists move ever so nonchalantly between African enslavement and Indian business success. As such, Indians are not the beneficiaries of African enslavement. Hinds consistently imply that Indians “owe” Africans something because Africans were enslaved.
Thirdly, it is Africans who have controlled state power for the greater part of Guyana’s post-colonial history. Twenty-eight years is a long time. Even the current configuration of state power is not Indian per se. As a political scientist, Hinds would know that the state is broader than the government. The Guyanese state is still fundamentally African. The military, the police, and the civil service are all dominated by Afro-Guyanese. The notion that “...ultimate official decision-making lie with the representatives of one race...” is, therefore, unsustainable.
David Hinds also gives the impression that the Afro-Guyanese middle class is oppressed. For a nationalist like Hinds even Afro-Guyanese middle class success is not evidence of progress! Rather, Hinds wants dedicated policies of affirmative action. Before Hinds drafts his proposals for the same, however, he should consider the following: (1) the best schools in Guyana are in Georgetown; (2) the best hospitals are in Georgetown; (3) practically all the important government facilities providing service to Guyanese citizens are in Georgetown; (4) practically all the modern sports facilities are in Georgetown. Georgetown, which does not produce anything, has all the facilities.
The point is that the urban areas in Guyana are heavily populated by Afro-Guyanese. Afro-Guyanese have had the access. I know this first hand because when I was at Queens College in mid 1970s more than half of that school’s population were Afro-Guyanese. And yes, they were outstanding students; they were not there as mere signs of “diversity” as in the U.S.
Hinds might also know that the whole town of Linden is subsidized because Guyanese bauxite is uncompetitive on world markets. That is the most extensive affirmative action project in the whole Caribbean. I wrote an article a few years defending this policy. Why? Well not because every decision has to be informed by a one-size fits all kind of neoliberal logic. Many communities need to be defended against that leviathan called globalization.
Finally, a quick note on Dr. Hinds position that a “gun-solution” is forced on African people because the government (I think Hinds means Indians) refuses to listen. That is a view that can only fuel an already explosive situation. I would much rather if Hinds sticks to the arguments for a political solution. In my own view the political solution is at the ballot box. Watch out for some interesting coalitions.
On Re-writing Guyana’s Political History
David Hinds is a controversial commentator on Guyanese politics. He has contributed to debates on issues such as power sharing and marginalization. Further, Hinds is presumed to have a stake in Guyana’s politics, being a key WPA activist.
Dr. Hinds recently published an article in the well regarded academic journal Social and Economic Studies 5 (1), 67-82 (2005), under the title “Problems of Democratic Transition in Guyana: Mistakes and Miscalculations in 1992.” The article argues that the PPP botched a chance at forging a national consensus government during and immediately after the 1992 general elections. While generally interesting, the article suffers from three fundamental problems pertaining to epistemology, historiography, and strategy. In addition, there are real problems of accuracy.
Three Problems with Hinds’ Analyses
Hinds’ first problem is epistemological, meaning that his procedure of knowledge construction is suspect. In contradistinction to the more social scientific historical materialism which had informed much of Hinds’ previous work, the Social and Economic Studies piece is a form of super-structural idealism. In turn, this idealism is itself driven by cultural nationalism. Cultural nationalism is a kind of aggressive ideology which, when employed, disallows the analyst from being objective. One specific by-product of cultural nationalism is that it facilitates the making of extraordinary and self-serving claims, many of which are present in Dr. Hinds’ article.
Hinds’ second problem is one of historiography, which might be broadly defined as the methodology of history writing. There are three currents in Hinds’ historiography. The first two – materialism and post-colonialism (which together constitute a thoughtful kind of anti-imperialism, broadly defined) are consistent with much Third World scholarship, and, in important ways, continues the work of such noted historians as Walter Rodney. The third element of Hinds’ historiography, however, is deeply troubling. This third element is presentism. Presentism is employed to create knowledge with the intent of legitimizing current political interests. How is this rearrangement of the historical record done? In his book Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History, the brilliant Haitian anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot (University of Chicago) has shown how silence is a technique used to erase those parts of history we do not wish to be remembered. According to Trouillot:
Silences enter the process of historical production at four crucial moments: the moment of fact creation (the making of sources); the moment of fact assembly (the making of archives); the moment of fact retrieval (the making of narratives); and the moment of retrospective significance (the making of history in the final instance) (Trouillot, 1995:26).
In his version of Guyanese politics circa 1992, David Hinds manipulates the sources, the archives, the narratives, and ultimately the history.
Hinds edits out many parts of the 1992 electoral story. First he says absolutely nothing about the leading role the PPP had played in challenging the PNC illegitimate rule. On the contrary, Hinds gives the impression that the fight for democracy began in the late 1970s, and that the WPA was the main opposition party. It also says that the PCD was the major force for change in Guyana, a claim that is only possible if you date the pro-democracy struggle from the mid 1980’s. Quotations from Prof. Ralph Premdas are used to buttress claims of the importance of the WPA. But worse yet, Hinds constructs Desmond Hoyte as a sort of enlightened gentleman who had seen the light of “the democratic ethos.” He makes the extraordinary argument that Hoyte’s acceptance of the 1992 election results was a “concession”. Hoyte’s long history with the party that had kept Guyana in ruins was, for all practical purposes, silenced. In Hinds’ text, Hoyte emerges as the Hero of the 1992 elections, a conclusion that should be flogged by common sense.
Let us turn to the question of political strategy around the 1992 election. Hinds says that by contesting the election as a party the PPP chose ‘victory’ instead of the national interest. The latter apparently would have been secured through some form of ‘big tent coalition’ and a subsequent consensus government.
There are three mind-boggling parts to Hinds’ claims here.
Firstly, Hinds writes about various WPA positions, mostly about what that party wanted. There are lots of quotations from Rupert Roopnarine and Eusi Kwayana, apparently aimed at providing an “insiders” view of what transpired. While all of that is fine, there is one lingering question, namely – on whose behalf was the WPA speaking? The party did not have any kind of mass following. Popular support was enjoyed during the days of Rodney, but since the assassination of that great Guyanese son, the WPA had become a “talk shop” made up of urban/cosmopolitan intellectuals. Should a “2% Party” really make the kinds of demands that the WPA was making?
Secondly, the WPA by Hinds’ own admission did not want Dr. Jagan to head the PCD list. Here is Hinds on that point: “When the issue of a consensus PCD presidential candidate arose, the PPP proposed its leader, Cheddi Jagan, but the WPA preferred a neutral candidate outside of political parties. The WPA felt that given Jagan’s central role in the racial acrimony of the past, his candidacy would alienate African voters” (Hinds, 77). Hinds appears to be shocked that the PPP would nominate its own leader to head the PCD list! That is just political naivety; and naivety is forgivable. What is more difficult to comprehend though is that the WPA had no respect for a leader who had been popularly elected in 1953, 1957, 1961, and who would have won the 1964 election had there not been the machinations of Cold War international politics. All the early elections were won on the basis of the struggle for national liberation and what, today, we might call domestic human security.
In contradistinction to the WPA which could not even decide on its own leader, Dr. Jagan had real political support. Winning a free and fair election is not such a bad thing.
The third aspect of WPA/Hinds’ strategic thinking circa 1992 is more than mind-boggling. Here in brass-tacks is what the WPA wanted: “We were asking the PCD to consider a power-sharing cabinet shared equally between the PNC and chaired by President Hoyte” (Quoted in Hinds, 74). This idea was presented to the PNC by Dr. Roopnarine on behalf of the WPA.
Not surprisingly, the PNC was interested. Hinds writes that according to reliable sources “...the PPP led the charge against the proposal” (Hinds, 74). But this is actually misleading. This author interviewed Paul N. Tennassee, the leader of the DLM, who said that he would have never supported the WPA proposal. When asked why, Tennassee says he considered Hoyte an “Electoral Bandit”. Moreover, the WPA approached the PNC with its proposal without clearing it with other members of the PCD. Hinds has clearly silenced that part of the story as well.
According to Tennassee, Dr. Jagan was absolutely prepared to share power with the WPA and others, but that infighting within the WPA meant they could never decide on their own representation on a PCD ticket. Incredibly, the WPA wanted the DLM to nominate Clive Thomas for a position! Hinds silences this point as well. The DLM, not the PPP, thought the WPA had really lost touch with reality.
The PNC was interested in the WPA proposal. Why shouldn’t it? They had to be because after decades of poor leadership, a ‘begging bowl economy’ and unfair elections, the only way of holding on to state power was through some non-electoral mechanism. The WPA was a God-send organization for the PNC in this regard. The WPA, of course, was also interested because it had no record of electoral accomplishments in Guyana. The only way to office was through some ad hoc mechanism.
So what was the essence of the WPA proposal? Simply put it was this: (a) put the very person (Hoyte) who had rigged elections for nearly three decades into power; (b) give the same (defeated) party equal presence in the consensus government; (c) award high offices to the WPA and DLM despite the fact they had minimal electoral following; (c) and simultaneously prevent the leader of the PPP, Dr. Jagan, from being a part of the government.
The astonishing thing about all of this is that the WPA and Dr. Hinds are surprised that the PPP did not support the proposal. Worse than that, the WPA and Dr. Hinds never thought of the PPP supporters and how they would receive a PNC leader who would have been just defeated, and who was a major player in the politics of the past three decades. It apparently never occurred to Dr. Hinds that the franchise of citizens does in fact matter. In the long run it is Guyanese citizens who would and should matter.
One final point. This writer has always wondered why the WPA, despite its obvious talents, has been in the political backwater for years. Dr. Hinds has now provided part of the answer. The proposal described above, which the WPA thought was so insightful, was in fact devoid of basic political logic. Someone should tell them. Someone should also encourage them to abandon cultural nationalism and tactical presentism. They should focus on winning some votes. That isn’t all that bad for democracy.
Dr. Randy Persaud is an Associate Professor of International Relations, American University, Washington DC.
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